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THE ACCIDENTAL PURIST: RECLAIMING THE
GERTZ ALL PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE




More than a quarter-century has passed since the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,1 attempted to resolve
years of uncertainty in its defamation jurisprudence. One of several his-
toric elements of Gertz was its designation of certain libel plaintiffs as
"public figures for all purposes."2 Over the years, this category grew in
haphazard fashion to include not only persons of great influence in public
affairs, but celebrities in the entertainment and sports worlds as well.
3
Journalism has undergone profound change since Gertz was decided.
Celebrity coverage is no longer relegated to the inside pages of newspapers
and magazines or the final moments of a newscast.4 The amount of news
media time and space given to celebrities has grown dramatically. 5
This Article will argue that current interpretation of the Gertz "all
purpose public figure" rule is unfair to many people considered as celebri-
ties. They were not intended to fall indiscriminately under the Gertz orbit
* Assistant Professor of Journalism, The University of Arizona; J.D. 1991, University of
Louisville School of Law; B.S. 1988, Regents College, University of the State of New York.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Id. at 345.
3. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997); Newton v.
NBC, Inc., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1990); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir.
1976); see also Harry W. Stonecipher & Don Sneed, A Survey of the Professional Person as Libel
Plaintiff: Reexamination of the Public Figure Doctrine, 46 ARK. L. REv. 303, 303-09 (1993).
4. See Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the First Amendment for the Rest of
Us?, 9 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that the "serious side" of traditional
mainstream news is crossing over into a "tabloid world").
5. See id. at 2. ("There is no recognition in tabloid journalism of any dividing line between
'public' and 'private' life. The private lives of celebrities and leaders, indeed, are a primary focus
of attention.").
560 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:559
of this rule.6
The approach suggested here is not a "free pass" for the famous.
Many star performers, athletes, and other celebrities quite purposefully
make themselves public figures with respect to certain subjects.7 In other
instances, their celebrity touches sufficiently on matters of public impor-
tance to justify a high degree of solicitude for the news media.8 But this
Article will suggest that mere fame is not enough to obliterate a celebrity's
right to defend their reputations where extremely personal matters are at
issue, that the Gertz Court could not have had such a result in mind, and
that a modest reappraisal is appropriate.
Part II of this Article explains the dramatic rise in news media atten-
tion to celebrities. Part III traces the history of public plaintiff libel rules.
Part IV examines the modem application of the all purpose public figure
rule to celebrities and suggests that many entertainment and sports person-
alities were drawn into the all purpose public figure category virtually by
accident. Part V proposes a modification of our current understanding of
the public figure rules to create a more equitable balance between First
Amendment freedoms and the right of all citizens--even celebrities-to
protect their reputations.
II. THE RECENT RISE OF CELEBRITY JOURNALISM
Advances in technology, occurring simultaneously with new business
pressures and changes in audience tastes, have made print and broadcast
news content very different than they were in 1974 when Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.9 was decided.1° Modem journalists race through news cycles
6. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (1977) (defining "voluntary pub-
lic figures" as those who place themselves in the "public eye" by actively engaging in public ac-
tivities or by assuming public roles). "[T]here is a public interest which attaches to people who
by their accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and
widespread attention to their activities." Gary Williams, "On the QT and Very Hush Hush": A
Proposal to Extend California 's Constitutional Right to Privacy to Protect Public Figures from
Publication of Confidential Personal Information, 19 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 337, 347 (1999) (quot-
ing Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Ct. App. 1962)).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f (defining "involuntary" public
figures as those who have not sought publicity or have not consented to it, but have nonetheless
become a subject of public interest by virtue of their involvement with newsworthy events or
people); see also Williams, supra note 7, at 348 (noting that a person can become an involuntary
public figure by mere relation to an established "public" figure).
9. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
10. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 7-10 (hypothesizing that more "serious" news organiza-
tions have become "tabloidy" based on three factors: competitive pressures; changing cultural
norms; and the proliferation of the media).
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of hours, not days." Only a few years ago, newspaper proprietors dreaded
being "scooped" by the more immediate medium of television-now tele-
vision fears being beaten by twenty-four-hour cable channels, the Internet,
and even wireless text messaging. 12
Today's news has become, according to a former columnist of The
New York Times, "a matter of star-gazing."' 13  Another journalist disap-
proved of the media as "runny with the virus of celebrity."' 4 The former
CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite once decried tabloid shows as "traves-
ties of genuine news presentations."'15 Now, however, it is increasingly dif-
ficult to tell the difference. Although so-called tabloid media have covered
some important stories and mainstream media occasionally have toppled
into tabloid territory, there can be little doubt today that the two have con-
verged. 16
Celebrity coverage is now a mainstay of the mainstream.' 7 The editor
of the National Enquirer reportedly hung several magazine covers on his
wall: Time trumpeted a story on UFOs;' 8 Newsweek pictured a gay musi-
cian and her lover planning a family;' 9 the Enquirer itself featured photos
11. See generally BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, WARP SPEED (1999) (concerning
problems of the "Never-Ending News Cycle"); see also David A. Logan, All Monica, All of the
Time: The 24-Hour News Cycle and the Proof of Culpability in Libel Actions, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 201, 206 (2000) (describing the "never-ending news cycle" as a "race to the ethical
bottom" and a quest to report the nation's "blockbuster" first).
12. See, e.g., Erin St. John Kelly, You Won't Believe This, but Marcia Brady Is in Prada,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at G3. Enrolled members of a wireless text messaging service, NYC
Celeb Sightings, call in news of a celebrity in the area. Id. The news is then transmitted to cell
phones and pagers of fellow subscribers, "allowing them to gawk vicariously." Id.
13. Pete Mortensen, Columnist: Coverage Shifted from Issues to Icons, DAILY NW., Nov. 2,
1999, at 8 (quoting Tom Wicker, former New York Times columnist, in his address to students at
Northwestern University).
14. PETE HAMILL, NEWS IS A VERB: JOURNALISM AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 79 (1998).
15. WALTER CRONKITE, A REPORTER'S LIFE 375 (1996).
16. See Smolla, supra note 4, at 6-7; see also Tom Rosenstiel, US. Press: Paying for Its
Sins, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at C3 ("Instead of distinguishing ourselves from tabloids, and
from pseudo news programs like 'Hard Copy' or from Web gossip mongers like Matt Drudge, we
are starting to resemble them.").
17. See, e.g., Rosenstiel, supra note 16. Although this Article discusses only United States
law, the tabloid phenomenon is international. Researchers at Westminster University in the
United Kingdom reported that tabloid material--crime, consumer, and show business news-rose
sharply on newscasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation and the ITV network. Matt Wells,
'Tabloid Shift' in TV News, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2000), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
Distribution/RedirectArtifact/0,4678,0-341606,00.html.
18. Richard Turner, A Tabloid Shocker, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 12, 1998, at 70 (describing the
Roswell events).
19. Id. (detailing the events surrounding Melissa Ethridge).
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of celebrity tragedy victims.20 The collage was entitled, "Which One Is the
Tabloid?"'"
Many journalism observers believe that mainstream media's embrace
of tabloid values has been so complete that the original tabloids cannot
compete.22 "The advent of 24-hour news networks, talk TV that blurs the
line between truth and conjecture, entertainment news shows and the main-
stream media's growing appetite for sensational stories have eaten away at
the tabs' once-plentiful readership ....
Celebrities often feel violated by coverage of their personal affairs.24
They consider it "the prose version of the strip search. 2 5 Many entertain-
ment and sports figures likely would agree with the magazine writer who
observed, "Journalism today... has become such an odd, arrogant animal
[that] it no longer plays by any recognizable rules. 2 6
When stars feel obliged to sue for libel, though, they find themselves
27included in the heavily-burdened category of public figure plaintiffs. As
such, they have only a modest chance of surviving a summary judgment
motion, let alone prevailing on the merits.28
Perhaps even more significant-if less conspicuous in case reporters
and law journals-is the celebrities' common belief that recourse in court is
not worth pursuing because the legal burden is too great.2 9 "There was a
feeling that if you were a star, you had to take that kind of abuse-that it
came with the territory," according to a lawyer who frequently represents
Hollywood personalities.30 Some celebrities feel that no remedy for media
20. Id. (depicting celebrities such as Bill Cosby, whose son was murdered).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 70-71.
23. Darcie Lunsford, Taming the Tabloids, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept. 2000, at 52, 55.
24. See Neal Gabler, The Gossip of Mount Olympus, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1991, at A23; see
also Jamie E. Nordhaus, Note, Celebrities' Rights to Privacy: How Far Should the Paparazzi Be
Allowed to Go?, 18 REv. LITIG. 285, 288 (1999); see also Alex Beam, Tabloid Law, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 55, 56.
25. Gabler, supra note 24.
26. Eric Boehlert, Junk Journalism, NATION, Aug. 6-13, 2001, at 4, 5.
27. Press Release, Libel Defense Resource Center, Inc., New LDRC Study Shows Highest
Incidence of Summary Judgment Grants to Defendants in Media Defamation Cases (Aug. 7,
1997), at http://www.ldrc.com/PressReleases/bu11997-3.html [hereinafter New LDRC Study]
(explaining that plaintiffs classified as public figures give defendants in libel actions a consider-
able "boost" in the likelihood of success on a summary judgment motion because public figure
plaintiffs must prove that the media defendant published the libelous statements with actual mal-
ice).
28. See id.; see also David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current
Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REv. 503, 509-12 (2001).
29. See Beam, supra note 24, at 60-61.
30. Id. at 56 (quoting attorney Barry Langberg, who represented Carol Burnett in her libel
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excess exists, short of punching their tormentors in the nose. 3' Conse-
quently, many libel suits may be devoutly wished, but never filed.
III. PUBLIC FIGURE PLAINTIFF RULES
Impliedly, public and private plaintiffs had identical status prior to the
Supreme Court's decision32 in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.33 The
common law privilege of fair comment protected some remarks and reports
about public officials, civic leaders, persons taking positions on matters of
public concern, and "those who offer their creations for public approval,"
including artists, performers, and athletes.34 Some courts confined the
privilege to statements of opinion, but others included misstatements of
fact.
31
In 1964, the Supreme Court began to constitutionalize libel law in
New York Times, holding that the First Amendment required a public offi-
cial suing for defamation over a statement concerning his official conduct
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made the
statement with "actual malice. 36  The Court defined actual malice as
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or [made] with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.
3 7
The plaintiff in New York Times was an elected city commissioner
with responsibility for, among other things, police and fire departments.38
The allegedly defamatory statements, in his view, concerned his official
conduct.39 Sullivan thus was the perfect public plaintiff to face heavy bur-
suit against the National Enquirer).
31. See Ann W. O'Neill, High Court Won't Provide Another Sequel to Baldwin Saga, L.A.
TIMES, June 18, 2000, at BI. The actor Alec Baldwin hit a photographer waiting for Baldwin and
his wife, the actress Kim Basinger, to bring their newborn daughter home from the hospital. Id.
Baldwin was acquitted of a misdemeanor battery charge and, in a civil trial, ordered to pay the
photographer $4,500 for lost wages and medical bills. Id. The photographer's appeal was de-
nied. Zanger v. Baldwin, No. 5086796, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 4912 (June 14, 2000).
32. See Andrew K. Craig, The Rise in Press Criticism of the Athlete and the Future ofLibel
Litigation Involving Athletes and the Press, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 527, 529-33 (1994).
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. 1 ARTHUR B. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 138 (1969).
35. Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908). The plaintiff in Coleman was a
candidate for public office, but the court stated that its reasoning applied to "a great variety of
subjects and include[d] matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office." Id. at
285.
36. See id. at 279-80.
37. Id. at 280.
38. Id. at 256.
39. See id. at 258. Although Sullivan was not named or identified by his government posi-
tion in the advertisement at issue, he argued that false allegations of police misconduct defamed
2002]
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dens in a libel suit, for to write about his official conduct was to write about
government. 40 The Court even likened defamation lawsuits by public fig-
ures to charges of seditious libel.
Three years later, the Court expanded the actual malice rule to some
non-official libel plaintiffs. Deciding Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and
Associated Press v. Walker together,42 the Court found that the plaintiffs
Butts and Walker enjoyed the special privilege of high public interest and
the ability to refute defamatory allegations.43 Therefore, they should be
considered public figures.44
Butts was the athletic director of the University of Georgia. 45  As
such, he might logically have borne the public official's burden, because
the story-an allegation of cheating--concerned his conduct in his previ-
ous position as head football coach at the public university.46 However, his
athletic director salary was paid by a private corporation, not by the State.47
Walker served in the United States Army.48 Although he no longer served
as a public official, he remained an active and frequently controversial par-
ticipant in public affairs.49
The Court found that both plaintiffs were public figures. 50 There was
little doubt that by taking a prominent role in the matter leading to the
claimed defamation-a contentious demonstration against desegregation at
the University of Mississippi--General Walker had thrust "his personality
,,51Iinto the 'vortex' of an important public controversy ....
Butts' status was a different matter. As noted above, he was not on
the State payroll, although he was the functional equivalent of a public of-
ficial. 52 He had been a well-known and respected football coach at Georgia
before assuming the athletic directorship. 53 "[He] may have attained [his
him in his capacity as the official responsible for police. Id.
40. See id. at 282-83.
41. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-77. The seditious libel analogy had been ad-
vanced by counsel for The New York Times. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 144-47 (1991).
42. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
43. Id. at 154-55.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 135.
46. See id. at 135-36.
47. Id. at 135.
48. Butts, 388 U.S. at 140.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 154-55.
51. Id. at 155.
52. Id. at 135, 154.
53. Id. at 135-36.
THE ACCIDENTAL PURIST
public figure] status by position alone., 54 Like Walker, Butts "commanded
sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the means
of counterargument '55 to expose the fallacies of defamatory allegations.56
Justice Harlan, writing for a four-member plurality, would have im-
posed a higher burden on such plaintiffs, but not as high as the burden re-
quired by New York Times.57 Under Harlan's formulation, a non-official
public figure could "recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose
substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsi-
ble publishers. 58
However, examination of the Butts public figure concept must begin
not with the plurality, but with the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Warren. 59 He provided the lasting rationale for expanding the New York
Times rule to certain non-official plaintiffs:
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between govern-
mental and private sectors are blurred. Since the depression of
the 1930's and World War II there has been a rapid fusion of
economic and political power, a merging of science, industry,
and government, and a high degree of interaction between the
intellectual, governmental, and business worlds. Depression,
war, international tensions, national and international markets,
and the surging growth of science and technology have precipi-
tated national and international problems that demand national
and international solutions. While these trends and events have
occasioned a consolidation of governmental power, power has
also become much more organized in what we have commonly
considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy
determinations which traditionally were channeled through for-
mal political institutions are now originated and implemented
through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions,
corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected
with the Government. This blending of positions and power has
also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not
hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately in-
54. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155.
55. Id. at 155.
56. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 155.
59. Id. at 162.
2002]
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volved in the resolution of important public questions or, by rea-
son of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at
large.60
Although the Butts decision produced several opinions, all the Jus-
tices agreed with the central proposition: the First Amendment requires
some limits on the use of state libel laws by public figures, as well as pub-
lic officials. 61 The status of the plaintiff continued to determine whether or
not actual malice must be proved.62
A different threshold emerged briefly in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.63 As in Butts, the Court's ambivalence was evident. 4 A plurality of
only three justices abandoned reliance on the public-private status of the
plaintiff.65 Instead, the actual malice requirement applied if the disputed
statement involved a matter of general or public concern, regardless of the
plaintiff's status.66 "The public's primary interest is in the event," Justice
Brennan wrote for the plurality.67 The public focus "is on the conduct of
the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not
the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety."
68
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice Stewart, feared that "all
human events are arguably within the area of 'public or general con-
cem.' '69 Marshall also predicted that the plurality's approach would re-
quire the Supreme Court to assume "constant and continuing supervision of
defamation litigation .... ,70 Justice Harlan, recalling the Warren concur-
rence in Butts, suggested that libelous depictions of private persons are not
likely to involve matters of public significance.71
60. Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
61. Id. at 162.
62. See id. at 154-55; see also JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, HANDBOOK OF
FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 231-35 (1979) (stating that Chief Justice Warren's concurring
opinion-that the New York Times actual malice standard should apply to public figures-has
subsequently been cited as the authority for that proposition).
63. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
64. See id. at 30 (indicating a three-justice plurality with concurring and dissenting opinions
filed).
65. See id. at 44. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in the
plurality opinion. Id. Justices Black and White filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Id.
Justice Douglas, who might have been expected to join Justice Black in his usual view of an abso-
lute privilege against libel judgments, did not participate in the decision. Id.
66. Id. at 44-45, 52 n.18.
67. Id. at 43.
68. Id.
69. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 81.
71. Id. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The author respectfully suggests that Justice Harlan
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The uncertain "public concern" approach survived only two years.72
Then came Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.73 Rejecting the Rosenbloom ration-
ale, the Court returned to the public-private plaintiff approach.74 Public
plaintiffs henceforth would include public officials, other persons who vol-
untarily play prominent roles in public controversies, 75 and all purpose pub-
lic figures.76
Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order
to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment.77
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, suggested restraint in declar-
ing anyone to be an all purpose public figure.78 "Absent clear evidence of
general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in
the affairs of society," Powell declared, "an individual should not be
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life."79 Powell's view
was consistent with Warren's public figure formulation in Butts, which en-
visioned some important contribution to the conduct of public affairs; the
all purpose public figure must be involved in resolution of public questions
or must shape events that concern society. 0
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ALL PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE RULE
Determination of the libel plaintiffs public or private status often de-
cides the case itself.8' The Supreme Court has ruled that courts must grant
got that one wrong. He could not have forseen what would happen in an era of increasingly care-
less "journalism." A Bakersfield, California farmer, Khalid Khawar, who had no public identity
whatsoever, was victimized by a book author and a tabloid newspaper by the suggestion that
Khawar assassinated U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Khawar v. Globe Int'l Inc., 965
P.2d 696, 699-700 (Cal. 1998). Working as a freelance photographer, a young Khawar merely
had been onstage taking photographs at about the time Senator Kennedy was shot backstage. Id.
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (rejecting the Rosenbloom
plurality).
73. Id. at 323.
74. Id. at 344-46.
75. See id. at 345.
76. Id. at 352.
77. Id. at 345.
78. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
81. See New LDRC Study, supra note 27; see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN
2002]
568 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:559
summary judgment to defamation defendants unless a public official or
public figure plaintiff can show readiness to offer clear and convincing evi-
dence of actual malice. 82 Lower courts take this direction seriously: Ap-
proximately eighty-five percent of all libel suits brought by public official
and public figure plaintiffs are dismissed with summary judgment.
83
It is now universally understood that certain celebrities-superstars
and even lesser lights-are considered all purpose public figures.84 "Noth-
ing changes their status. They are recognized by substantial segments of
the mass audience .... They include the stars of stage and screen, the great
athletes of our time, the prize winners, the creators of our fads and fash-
ions, the great corporations, and the movers and shakers. ' 8s
Thus, Johnny Carson, a hugely successful entertainer who hosted
"The Tonight Show" on the NBC television network for thirty years, was
considered to be an all purpose public figure.86 Wayne Newton, a singer
and actor best known for his enduring popularity in Las Vegas show-
rooms, 87 and the comedienne and actress Carol Burnett88 have borne the
same burden. 89 So have the noted writer and former television host Wil-
liam F. Buckley, Jr.90 and the film actor Clint Eastwood. 91
Eastwood, a "mega-star' '92 by any standard, made himself a public of-
ficial for a time by serving in the elective office of mayor of Carmel, Cali-
fornia.93 Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,94 he may be considered a
public official with respect to statements concerning his official conduct.
He has remained active in the political and economic life of the Carmel
AN OPEN SOCIETY 119 (1992).
82. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986).
83. New LDRC Study, supra note 27.
84. BARRON & DIENES, supra note 62, at 279; DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 174
(2d ed. 1981); THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 92 (3d ed.
1997).
85. DONALD M. GILLMOR, ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 58
(1996).
86. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1976).
87. See Newton v. NBC, Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1990).
88. See Beam, supra note 24, at 56.
89. Newton, 930 F.2d at 668; see also Bumett v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206,
216 (Ct. App. 1983).
90. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1976).
91. Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 1254 (Judge Kozinski, in his opinion for the court of appeals, used the term "liti-
gious mega-star" to describe Eastwood.).
93. See Mark A. Stein, Eastwood Scores Easy Win in Carmel Mayor's Election, L.A. TIMES
(Late Edition), Apr. 9, 1986, at 3.
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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area.95 Although he is an all purpose public figure under current reasoning,
under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,96 he surely could be a limited public fig-
ure for those matters in which he has voluntarily assumed a prominent
role.9 7
Buckley, as a political columnist and commentator, has thrust himself
to the forefront of hundreds of public controversies.98 He would logically
be a limited public figure on those many occasions. 99 Such a prolific pur-
veyor of discourse on public issues might even fit Chief Justice Warren's
description of a person who, "by reason of [his] fame, shape[s] events in
areas of concern to society at large."100
One has difficulty however, understanding how Carson, Burnett, or
Newton can be said to have shaped events or played a sufficiently "influen-
tial role in ordering society"' O' to qualify for all purpose public figure
status. 10 2 A colorable argument can be made that Newton, by applying for
ownership of a Las Vegas hotel and its gambling license, 10 3 thrust himself
to the forefront of an important public issue in that community. However,
this particular act hardly makes him a "public personality for all aspects of
his life.'
10 4
And what of Carson's wife,'0 5 who acquired public figure status en-
tirely by her marriage?10 6 Or, sillier still, a man's wife once had a romantic
relationship with Elvis Presley-Presley's public figure status was imputed
to her, which in turn was imputed to her husband! 107
95. See, e.g., Jesus Sanchez, Star Studded Group to Buy Pebble Beach, L.A. TiMES, June
18, 1999, at C2 (Eastwood, the golfer Arnold Palmer, and other investors bought the Pebble
Beach golf course, a Monterey Peninsula landmark, in 1999.).
96. 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
97. See id.
98. Buckley, 539 F.2d at 885-86.
99. But see id. (The court nevertheless found him a public figure for all purposes.).
100. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
101. Id.; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
102. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351-52 (discussing both all purpose and limited public fig-
ure status).
103. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 666.
104. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
105. Carson, 529 F.2d at 210 (Joanna Holland married Carson subsequent to the filing of
his action against Allied News.).
106. Id. ("[O]ne can assume that the wife of a public figure such as Carson more or less
automatically becomes at least a part-time public figure herself.").
107. Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1980). Anita
Brewer was a singer and entertainer in her own right; her husband was well-known as a football
player at the University of Mississippi and later as a businessman and failed candidate for the
Mississippi House of Representatives. Id. at 1248-49. None of his activities related to the state-
ments at issue in the defamation lawsuit, which concerned Mrs. Brewer's former relationship
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V. PERVASIVE POWER AND INFLUENCE?
How did public figure classification reach this point? One looks in
vain for references in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts'08 and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.109 to television talkers, casino crooners, and Elvis exes. 1" 0
Since Gertz, the Supreme Court has acknowledged unspecified public fig-
ure status where the parties so stipulated.11" ' The Court's pre-Gertz refer-
ence to Wally Butts-that he "may have attained that status by position
alone" in contrast to General Walker's purposeful activity" 2-is sometimes
used as an example of the category.'1 3 It is important to remember, how-
ever, that Butts's position was virtually official and that the defamatory
statement at issue concerned his conduct in that capacity."
14
Perhaps the confusion began with the case of Orlando Cepeda, a star
baseball player for the San Francisco Giants.1 5 Cepeda sued a media com-
pany that published criticism of his ability and questioned his future with
the team. 1 6 The defendant won summary judgment at the initial trial be-
cause the disputed statement was not libelous per se. 17 The appeals court,
however, reversed the summary judgment decision and the case was tried
on the merits. 18 These developments occurred before Butts was decided,
so Cepeda's claim was to have been tried, and the appellate review consid-
ered, under traditional libel law." 9
with Presley. Id. at 1257-58.
108. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
109. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
110. See generally Butts, 388 U.S. at 130; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
111. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 & n.5 (1988). "Respon-
dent is the host of a nationally syndicated television show and was the founder and president of a
political organization formerly known as the Moral Majority. He is also the founder of Liberty
University in Lynchburg, Virginia, and is the author of several books and publications." Id. at 57
n.5 (citing WHO'S WHO 1N AMERICA 849 (44th ed. 1986-1987)). The author submits Reverend
Falwell could have been a limited public figure with respect to moral issues because many of his
public comments concerned moral behavior. Id.at 48-49. His morality was lampooned in the
parody leading to his libel and emotional distress complaints. Id. In any event, his all purpose
public figure status attached not simply because of his fame, but because of his considerable in-
volvement and national prominence in public discussion of morality and politics. See id. at 57 &
n.5.
112. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155.
113. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976).
114. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 135-36.
115. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1968).
116. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 870 (9th Cir. 1964).
117. Id. at 871.
118. Id. at 873.
119. See Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1968).
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By the time trial began on the merits, the Butts decision had been pub-
lished. 20 The court of appeals expansively affirmed the trial judge's de-
termination that Orlando Cepeda was a public figure:
"Public figures" are those persons who, though not public offi-
cials, are "involved in issues in which the public has a justified
and important interest." Such figures are, of course, numerous
and include artists, athletes, business people, dilettantes, anyone
who is famous or infamous because of who he is or what he has
done. 121
The appellate panel apparently had little guidance in making this pro-
nouncement, for there was no citation or other support. 122 The court might
have jumped too quickly at the Butts reference 123 to Spahn v. Julian Mess-
ner, Inc.,124 a case involving another legendary baseball player, Warren
Spahn. 125 The New York Court of Appeals had declared that Spahn "is a
public personality and that, insofar as his professional career is involved,
he is substantially without a right to privacy. 126 However, the Supreme
Court in Butts, citing Spahn, noted that Wally Butts and General Walker
both "commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest at
the time of the publications," thus both would be "labeled 'public figures'
under ordinary tort rules."
1 27
Under Spahn, Cepeda would not have been a public figure for all
elements of his life;128 however, under Butts, no such distinction was
made. 129 With respect to Cepeda, the distinction would not have made a
difference because his libel complaint concerned not a purely personal mat-
ter, but the very public subject that made him a public figure-professional
baseball.
30
A second and more lasting expansion of the public figure rule arrived
in Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.' 31 Waldbaum, the head of a
large retail services cooperative, sued Fairchild for defaming him in a re-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 419.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 418-20; see also Butts, 388 U.S. at 154-55.
124. 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1966).
125. Id. at 544.
126. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
127. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154.
128. See Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 545.
129. See Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 420-21 (9th Cir.
1968).
130. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 870 (9th Cir. 1964).
131. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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port that the cooperative was losing money. 132 Fairchild argued that it was
entitled to summary judgment because Waldbaum was a public figure and
could not prove actual malice as required of such a plaintiff as established
in Gertz.'
33
Although the district court found that Waldbaum was a limited public
figure, not an all purpose public figure, 134 the court of appeals felt obliged
to define the latter category also. 135 According to the court, "Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has not yet fleshed out the skeletal descriptions
of public figures and private persons enunciated in Gertz."' 36 Noting that
an all purpose public figure must have "assumed a 'role of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society,"",137 the court of appeals declared that a
"general public figure is a well-known 'celebrity,' his name a 'household
word.'
1 38
The court appeared to base this view on the presumption that celebri-
ties have access to the media if they are defamed. 39 The court reasoned
that the "public's proven preoccupation" with the celebrity indicated that
the media would happily cover a celebrity's response to a defamatory false-
hood. 140 Celebrities have "assumed the risk" that public exposure might
lead to misstatements about them; the fame that brings many benefits may
also generate adverse scrutiny. 141
This reasoning has a certain lazy charm. If people can't take the heat,
it suggests, they should stay out of the spotlight. However, by making
people public figures for all purposes, the Waldbaum approach forces ce-
lebrities into any spotlight, shone into the most intimate areas, not just the
cleansing light of useful information on important public matters. 1
42
The court appeared to recognize this problem, but ignored it in pursuit
of expansive dicta. 143 Celebrities' "renouncement of anonymity or toler-
ance of publicity unavoidably carries with it the possibility that the press, in
fulfilling its role of reporting and critiquing matters ofpublic concern, may
132. Id. at 1290.
133. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
134. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1291.
135. Id. at 1292-98.
136. Id. at 1292.
137. Id. at 1294 (quoting Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1294.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1294-95.
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investigate their talents, character, and motives."' 44
Read logically, this passage suggests that the court was referring to
character, talent, and motives relevant to matters of public concern. As the
all purpose public figure has evolved, however, anything about a celeb-
rity's life-despite its traditionally private subject matter- has become fair
game. 1
45
Such change may be the legacy of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
146
The Supreme Court made clear in Gertz that it was abandoning the public
interest criterion emphasized by Rosenbloom, instead returning to plaintiff-
based standards. 147 The Gertz court found that the Rosenbloom "approach
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could
render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable."' 148 It was eas-
ier, therefore, to categorize plaintiffs and apply the appropriate standard of
fault. 1
49
This perhaps explains why some courts, overreacting to the repudia-
tion of Rosenbloom, have abandoned the principle that underlies First
Amendment protection-facilitation of debate on public issues. 150 In fol-
lowing the Gertz rule, courts have focused almost entirely on one half of
the all purpose public figure test, while ignoring the other. Fame is not
enough.' 51 The well-known plaintiff must also have "pervasive involve-
ment in the affairs of society" to be declared a public figure for all pur-
poses. 1
52
VI. RECALIBRATING THE PUBLIC FIGURE DETERMINATION
How, then, can the rights of famous people be more appropriately
reconciled with the need for uninhibited discussion of public issues? The
author proposes using a two-part analysis to determine whether or not a ce-
lebrity should bear the heavy burden contemplated by Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts' 53 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
154
144. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added).
145. See, e.g., Carson, 529 F.2d at 206 (involving Carson's marriage to Joanna Holland).
146. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
147. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-48.
148. Id. at 343.
149. See id. at 343-44; see also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 157, 167
(1979) (holding that "[a] libel defendant must show more than mere newsworthiness .....
150. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
151. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
152. Id.
153. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
154. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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First, we should ask whether or not the person has such pervasive
power and influence-not merely fame-in the affairs of the community to
be considered an all purpose public figure. If the answer is no, the inquiry
ends. The person is not an all purpose public figure by the simple, inclu-
sive definition of Gertz: one who has "general fame or notoriety in the
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society." 15 5 An-
other kind of analysis presumably would begin, aimed at determining
whether that person is a limited public figure with respect to the alleged de-
famatory statement at issue.
If the answer is yes, simply proceed to the second question: does the
allegedly defamatory statement bear a sufficient connection to the famous
person's pervasive influence? If so, the plaintiff would be required to
prove actual malice. If not-if the matter is strictly personal and unrelated
to the source of the plaintiffs influence-the plaintiff would not be re-
quired to prove actual malice. Under the constitutional rule prohibiting "li-
ability without fault, ' 156 such a plaintiff would presumably be required to
prove negligence.
157
This inquiry, one must acknowledge immediately, seems contradic-
tory to the very notion of an all purpose public figure who bears this heavy
burden when seeking redress for any defamatory statement.15 8 However, it
is not contradictory. The language of Gertz itself is much more precise
than its subsequent interpretations by lower courts: "Absent clear evidence
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement
in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public per-
sonality for all aspects of his life."'
159
The Court's caution was well-grounded in its earlier actual malice
cases.160 Even public officials were not assumed to have opened their en-
tire lives to the risk of defamatory falsehood. 161 In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,162 the constitutional protection was extended only to statements
about the plaintiffs official conduct. 63 A subsequent decision made clear
that other defamatory falsehoods about a public official were entitled to
New York Times protection if they "touch on an official's fitness for of-
155. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
156. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
157. See id. at 347-49 (allowing states to impose liability under a lower standard of fault).
158. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (1976).
159. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
160. See id. at 342-46.
161. Id. at 351-52.
162. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
163. Id. at 279-80.
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fice."' 64 Thus, reports on personal characteristics of dishonesty, malfea-
sance, or improper motivation would still be afforded protection as long as
the nexus with official conduct was established.
16
For non-official all purpose public figures, oddly, the burden's
boundaries are more loosely set. 166 Under current interpretations of Gertz,
anything goes if the plaintiff is an all purpose public figure.' 67 In theory at
least, the President of the United States must prove actual malice only if the
defamatory statement concerns his official conduct or touches on his fitness
for office; a film star or a basketball hero must prove actual malice even if
the defamatory statement has nothing to do with movies or sports. 168 This
seems a strange result indeed for a fault rule that was conceived to protect
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public affairs and govern-
ment. 69
We must also recognize the privacy paradox. Society continues to
impose limits on publication of material of no public concern, even if the
material is true, without necessarily requiring a high level of defendant
fault. 170  More than four-fifths of the states and the District of Columbia
acknowledge the tort of public disclosure of private facts.' 7' Liability is
subject to constitutional limitations 172 and to a comprehensive defense of
newsworthiness, 73 but the tort's viability indicates a public view that some
things simply should not be publicized against the subject's will. 74 Thus
we have an absurd situation in which plaintiffs can have relief for publica-
tion of truthful statements about their most intimate affairs, but face much
greater difficulty winning damages for a false statement about the same
matter.
75
Professor Rodney A. Smolla, discussing privacy, has suggested some
subjects that may be considered "quintessentially intimate" material about
164. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971).
165. Id.
166. See Carson, 529 F.2d at 208-09.
167. See id.
168. As a practical matter, of course, a modem President of the United States is likely to be
such a celebrity-a household name-that he or she would also be an all purpose public figure
under the current rules. See discussion supra Part IV.
169. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
170. See TEDFORD, supra note 84, at 104-05; see generally PEMBER, supra note 84, at 223-
24.
171. See PEMBER, supra note 84, at 223-24.
172. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (finding no liability for
publishing truthful information lawfully obtained from judicial records open to public inspection).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h.
174. See TEDFORD, supra note 84, at 104-05.
175. See id.
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an individual, including mental and emotional condition, physical health,
love and sexual relationships, family relationships, victimization (including
whether an individual has been the victim of violent or sexual assault), and
financial matters. 176 In Professor Smolla's analysis, information may be
deemed private by considering its "intrinsic intimacy," the "extrinsic offen-
siveness" of disclosing it, and the extent to which the information has al-
ready been disseminated.177
Similarly, Professor Gary Williams has suggested that physical and
mental condition, financial affairs, or sexual and other personal relation-
ships are among those subjects that even a public figure should generally
be allowed to keep private. 178 Professor Williams notes that California
courts have found that even public figures retain some privacy rights.
79
Such matters surely are among "the sacred precincts of private and domes-
tic life" that Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis envisioned in their
historic call for recognition of a right to privacy.'
80
These views are consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts
with respect to defining a zone of privacy:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giv-
ing of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake,
with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent
standards, would say that he had no concern.
18 1
The Restatement further concludes that some "reasonable proportion is also
to be maintained between the event or activity that makes the individual a
public figure and the private facts to which publicity is given.'
182
A similar common sense approach to all purpose public figure defa-
mation would be perfectly symmetrical with the public official standard,
for it would impose the higher fault burden only when the defamatory
176. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 128 (1992). Citing Profes-
sor Smolla's list of intimate subjects does not imply that he would endorse the views advanced in
this Article. Indeed, Professor Smolla believes that the balance of public figures' and publishers'
interests must be tipped in favor of the publishers because making logically principled judgments
about newsworthiness is so difficult where public figures are involved. Id. at 125-26.
177. Id. at 127.
178. Williams, supra note 7, at 352-53 (1999). The author does not intend to impute his
views on this topic to Professor Williams.
179. Id. at 352 & n.107 (citing Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Ct.
App. 1983)).
180. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193,
195 (1890).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h.
182. Id.
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statement touches on the public figure's equivalent of official conduct, i.e.,
the matter of public interest that has made the plaintiff a public figure.
An examination of all purpose public figure cases 183 will illustrate the
impact and limits of the Gertz recalibration advanced in the beginning of
this Part. Under the suggested two-part test, all purpose public figure
plaintiffs might have prevailed in some cases, but not all.
Orlando Cepeda, the baseball hero, would not have to prove actual
malice because he was not pervasively involved in the affairs of society.1
84
This does not mean that criticism of his playing ability would be chilled; it
likely would be permitted under the long-established fair comment privi-
lege. 85 An opinion about Cepeda's playing ability would also be protected
as long as it was based on true facts and asserted no fact that could be
proven false.'
8 6
Johnny Carson, the television star, would not be required to prove ac-
tual malice unless a connection between his fame and a matter of sufficient
public concern could be shown.' 87 The defamatory statement at issue sug-
gested that because of a love affair, Carson might move his enormously
popular network television program from New York to California. '88 Such
a decision could reasonably be seen as having significant artistic impact
and economic consequences. If this nexus could be established, Carson
would be required to prove actual malice pursuant to the Gertz recalibra-
tion.
Carol Burnett, another television star, might fare better under this re-
calibration. She sued a tabloid publication over its false report that she was
drunk and abusive in a public restaurant. 89 This behavior is not as "quin-
tessentially intimate" as the matters suggested by Professors Smolla and
Williams and it has no connection with the reason for Burnett's fame-her
skill as an actress and comedienne. 190 Thus, under the recalibration test,
183. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Cepeda v. Cowles
Magazines & Broad., Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968).
184. But see Cepeda, 392 F. Supp. at 420 (finding that Cepeda had the burden to prove ac-
tual malice).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 606-610. The result would be the same
even though the fair comment privilege has been omitted. Id. A statement of opinion that does
not imply a defamatory statement is no longer actionable, thus the fair comment privilege is no
longer needed. Id.
186. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990) (implying a false asser-
tion of fact is not protected).
187. Contra Carson, 529 F.2d at 213.
188. Id. at 208.
189. Burnett v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (Ct. App. 1983).
190. However, Burnett is also known for speaking out against alcoholism. Id. at 221.
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Burnett would not have to prove actual malice. It is worth noting, of
course, that Burnett prevailed in her libel suit even with the actual malice
burden,19' but not all public plaintiffs will be blessed with evidence of such
egregiously reckless reporting as the National Enquirer used in its false
story about her.
192
Clint Eastwood presents perhaps the most interesting example of the
recalibration at work, for seldom has there been a show business personal-
ity of such great fame who is so involved in non-entertainment public af-
fairs.1 93 Suppose that a news medium publishes or broadcasts a story about
Eastwood's personal life. Assume that it concerns a subject in the Smolla-
Williams universe of purely private matters. 194 Nothing about the hypo-
thetical item involves public affairs. When the story appears, Eastwood is
participating in many matters of substantial interest to the citizenry. As in
real life, he is campaigning energetically for changes in permissible land
use on a section of the Monterey Peninsula. 195 Eastwood wants to build his
own golf course development in another area nearby. 196 Also, as in real
life, a Carmel hotel he owns was sued under the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA") 197 for allegedly failing to provide appropriate accommo-
dations for visitors with certain physical handicaps.198 When he criticized
the ADA during Congressional testimony, he drew a packed hearing room
and international press coverage.1 99
Surely Eastwood is at minimum a limited public figure with respect to
any one of these issues, with the possible exception of the ADA lawsuit.
200
191. Id. at 223.
192. See id. at 209-10.
193. See, e.g., Clint Eastwood Fights "Unfair" Disabilities Law, OTrAWA CITIZEN, May
19, 2000, at A 12, Westlaw, Canadian Newspapers.
194. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
195. Bettina Boxall, Pebble Beach Co. Changes Its Plan for Famous Forest, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 2000, at A24. Land use is an issue of enormous public importance in such an area. See id.
196. See id.
197. 42 U.S.C. § § 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). A jury found Eastwood's Mis-
sion Ranch Inn committed two minor violations of the Act, but denied money damages to the
plaintiff. Judy Fettner, Actor Clint Eastwood Cleared in Disability Suit, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Sept. 29, 2000, LEXIS, News, Wire Service Stories.
198. Fettner, supra note 197.
199. Paul Sullivan, Clint to Congress: Make My Day by Changing ADA Law, BOSTON
HERALD, May 19, 2000, at 18, LEXIS, News, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers; Clint East-
wood Fights "Unfair" Disabilities Law, OTTAWA CITIZEN, May 19, 2000, at A 12, Westlaw, Ca-
nadian Newspapers; Eastwood Speaks for Business, FT.com (May 19, 2000), at
http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=0005 19000338&query=eastwood+speak
S.
200. If the matters were taken in isolation, there might be a question about Eastwood's vol-
untary participation in the ADA lawsuit. Simply being sued is unlikely to convert a private per-
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But put them together, then add his former position as elected mayor, and it
would be reasonable to conclude that his influence is indeed pervasive and
powerful, at least in Carmel and the surrounding area. These facts, not
fame alone, might make him a public figure of the kind that Chief Justice
Warren envisioned: someone "intimately involved in the resolution of im-
portant public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas
of concern to society at large.
20 1
If that is so, then there can be only one answer to the first question
proposed in this Article: Eastwood is a public figure. As long as Gertz is
applied in accordance with the current understanding, he would be a public
figure for all areas of his life.
202
But must this combination of show business fame and civic activism
put him in such an untenable position when he tries to recover for damage
to his reputation in a purely personal area of his life? For that, we must ask
the second question: does the allegedly defamatory statement bear a suffi-
cient connection to the famous person's pervasive influence? The author
submits that it does not. Unless a nexus could be established between the
private matter and some area of Eastwood's civic or business involvement,
he should not be required to prove actual malice.
VII. INHIBITION OF PRESS FREEDOM?
Any revision of the existing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 20 3 formula is
likely to be seen as a retreat from essential, well-established news media
freedoms.2 4 That is not the intention of this proposal. In fact, defamation
defendants would retain a considerable array of protection against inappro-
priate lawsuits.
son into a public figure. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) (finding a
socially prominent woman seeking a divorce did not become a public figure by seeking relief
available only in court). Plaintiffs may also speak out in self-help--refuting charges against
them-without compromising their private status. See, e.g., Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 965 P.2d
696, 702-04 (Cal. 1998). However, criticizing the ADA and burdensome workplace rules in gen-
eral to a Congressional hearing might be enough assertion to transform a private person into a
public figure, even if speaking out occurs after defamation on a related matter. See id. at 703-04.
201. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the
result) (emphasis added).
202. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
203. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
204. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 780 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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Truth, as always, remains a complete defense to libel claims.20 5 In
addition, the burden of proving falsity would remain on the plaintiff.
20 6
Another fundamental principle of Gertz, that there can be no liability with-
out fault, is unchanged by this proposal.20 7
A defendant may show a nexus between the allegedly defamatory
statement, however personal on its face, and the source of the plaintiff's ce-
lebrity. 20 8 For example, if a film star or athlete regularly gave interviews
promoting the joy of monogamous marriage and the defamatory statement
alleged that the celebrity was promiscuous, a nexus might be established.20 9
The rule established by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 10 recognized
that error is inevitable in free debate. 21 1 This recalibration of Gertz simply
recognizes that false statements about intimate subjects, unrelated to public
issues, arguably contribute little or nothing to free debate as an ordered so-
ciety understands it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The creation in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.21 2 of all purpose public
figure plaintiffs was intended to protect reporting and commentary on those
persons who have general fame or notoriety and pervasive involvement in
the affairs of society.213 Mere stardom in the entertainment or sports world
should not be enough to saddle a libel plaintiff with the heavy burden of
proving actual malice when the defamatory statement concerns a purely
private-indeed, sometimes intimate-matter with no public consequences.
Such a burden far exceeds the stated purpose of the Supreme Court opin-
ions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
2 14 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
215
and Gertz.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a.
206. See Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768-69.
207. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h.
209. This circumstance might arguably make the celebrity a limited public figure for pur-
poses of the marriage discussion. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. However, some courts might find
that a discussion of marriage does not amount to thrusting oneself to the forefront of a sufficiently
controversial topic to become a limited public figure. See id. In such a case, the rule proposed in
this Article would actually provide additional protection for a news media defendant.
210. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
211. Id. at 271-72 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
212. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
213. Id. at 345.
214. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
215. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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Thus the all purpose public figure doctrine should be more correctly
understood as imposing the actual malice burden on celebrities only when
they are pervasively involved in public affairs and when the defamatory
statement bears a sufficient connection to the celebrity's influence on those
affairs.

